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PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
ALIMONY AFTER DIVORCE**
For the Wife-Constitutionality
During the past year, the Louisiana Supreme Court con-
sidered and upheld the constitutionality of article 160 of the
Civil Code,I yet the ultimate rationale for this holding remains
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** A case which may have a practical impact on alimony after divorce is Holiday
v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978). Although the issue involved alimony pending
suit under article 148 of the Civil Code, language in the decision may indicate the
opinion of the court on a waiver of alimony after divorce contained in a prenuptial
contract. The court held that a waiver of alimony pending suit contained in a prenup-
tial contract was null as against public policy. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 11. According to
the court, articles 119 and 120 express the public policy of the state as to personal
obligations of the spouses contracted with marriage, with article 148 providing the
enforcement for these provisions. Futhermore, "[tlhe policy involved is that condi-
tions which affect entitlement to alimony pendente lite cannot be accurately foreseen
at the time antenuptial agreements are entered, and the public interest in enforcement
of the legal obligation to support overrides the premarital anticipatory waiver of ali-
mony." 358 So. 2d at 620. For an analysis of the Holliday decision, see the upcoming
Note in Issue 4 of 39 LA. L. REv. (1979).
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 160 provides:
When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not sufficient means for
her support, the court may allow her, out of the property and earnings of the
husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income when:
1. The wife obtains a divorce;
2. The husband obtains a divorce on the ground that he and his
wife have been living separate and apart, or on the ground that there has
been no reconciliation between the spouses after a judgment of separation
from bed and board, for a specified period of time; or
3. The husband obtained a valid divorce from his wife in a court of
another state or country which had no jurisdiction over her person. This
alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the
wife remarries.
The constitutionality of Civil Code article 160 has previously been considered in
Whitt v. Vauthier, 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 558 (La.
1975). Whitt was commented upon in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1975-1976 Term-Persons, 37 LA. L. REv. 305 (1977). Interestingly enough, the
alternate rationale of Whitt, similar to that of the majority of the supreme court in
Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978), on original hearing, was referred to
in Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977). For a discussion of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Orr v. Orr, see text at notes 14-19, infra.
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somewhat unclear. As a defense to the wife's claim for alimony,
the husband in Loyacano v. Loyacano urged the unconstitu-
tionality of article 160.1 On original hearing, the court held that
article 160 was constitutional because the husband was entitled
to claim alimony after divorce under the same circumstances
as the wife.
According to Justice Dennis, if article 160 were interpreted
to allow only wives to collect alimony, the statute would con-
tain an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.4 Although
article 160 does not specifically authorize an award of alimony
for husbands, Louisiana is a "civil law jurisdiction" and "the
absence of express law does not imply a lack of authority for
courts to provide relief."' Justice Dennis reached the conclu-
sion that the positive law was silent regarding alimony for hus-
bands by examining the legislative expressions and by exten-
sive exegesis.' Thus, since the positive law is silent "the judge
is bound to proceed and decide according to equity."7 Examin-
ing the general policy consideration underlying article 160,8
2. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
3. The husband claimed that article 160 of the Civil Code constituted a denial
of equal protection of the laws to males under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 3, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
4. According to Justice Dennis, "[S]uch classifications for purposes of entitle-
ment to alimony after divorce probably were founded on the assumption that all former
husbands have sufficient means for their support, or that few divorced women have
property and earnings out of which alimony could be paid, or upon both." 358 So. 2d
at 307. Futhermore, he added: "If these propositions were ever true, common experi-
ence tells us that the deviations from them are now too numerous for the classifications
to withstand equal protection challenge." Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 308. The court stated:
Civilian judges may perform extensive exegesis to discover the original legisla-
tive intent; legislative texts may be interpreted so as to give them an application
that is consistent with the contemporary conditions they are called upon to
regulate; and a particular conflict of interests before the court may be resolved
in accordance with the general policy considerations which induced legislative
action rather than by reliance on logical deductions from the language of the
text.
Id.
7. Id. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 21.
8. The court stated: "The general policy consideration and practical reason
which appear to have induced the legislature to provide alimony after divorce was to
prevent divorced women without sufficient means from becoming wards of the state."
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Justice Dennis opined that the purpose of this socio-economic
legislation would also be served by granting support to either
spouse.
However, on rehearing, the majority of Justices held that
article 160 was constitutional but divided as to the proper ra-
tionale. Three of the Justices' held that even though article 160
"does not provide alimony to a needy husband, it is, nonethe-
less constitutional.' 0 The rationale was that "[s]tatutes else-
where allowing alimony only to wives have withstood the equal
protection argument . . . . [I]t is not within the province of
this Court to evaluate the legislative policy embodied in the
statute.""I Three other Justices concurred, 2 two for the reasons
expressed on original hearing. Justice Calogero, in dissent, was
of the opinion that article 160 was unconstitutional: "In this
case, I would invalidate Article 160 because of its gender-based
discrimination but I would not usurp the legislative function by
grafting onto our law a constitutionally permissible alimony
provision."113
358 So. 2d at 308. Furthermore, the court relied on the debates of the Louisiana
Constitutional Convention in 1973, stating:
The evolving nature of the role played by women in our state was clearly and
emphatically recognized by the provision banning invidious gender based dis-
crimination in the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Indeed, the debates at the
1973 Louisiana Constitutional Convention concerning the provision reflect that
the delegates considered alimony to be an important statutory right and con-
templated that the new equal protection clause would require that it be granted
equally to both sexes. Consequently, when we attribute to article 160 the mean-
ing that a present day legislator would have attributed to it, we must assume
that he would have taken cognizance of the increasing and expanding nature of
women's activities and responsibilities, as well as our constitution's prohibition
of arbitrary or unreasonable gender based legal classifications, and that he
would not have intended by the legislation to discriminate against husbands
who have not sufficient means for their maintenance by declaring them ineligi-
ble for alimony after divorce.
Id. at 309.
9. Chief Justice Sanders and Justices Summers and Marcus.
10. 358 So. 2d at 314.
11. Id. at 316. "Modification addresses itself to the legislature." Id. In fact, at
the 1978 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature Senator Hudson introduced
Senate Bill No. 573, which would have permitted courts to award alimony to husbands
if they were in need and not at fault. Although the bill passed the Senate, it received
an unfavorable report from the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure.
12. Justices Dennis, Tate, and Dixon.
13. 358 So. 2d at 317 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
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Despite the conflicting rationales of Loyacano, 4 some
direction was given by the United States Supreme Court in Orr
v. Orr."6 In that case a similar Alabama alimony statute was
declared unconstitutional. On the merits, the Court held that
the alimony statute imposing an obligation upon men only was
discriminatory and thus prohibited by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The state objectives
urged as justification for the gender-based classification were
"the State's preference for an allocation of family responsibili-
ties under which the wife plays a dependent role,"' 6 provision
for a needy spouse "using sex as a proxy for need,"' 7 and com-
pensation for past discrimination against women during mar-
riage. According to Justice Brennan, none of the objectives
advanced were sufficient to justify Alabama's statute, espe-
cially when compared to a gender-neutral law which would
place the obligation on the spouse able to pay. In fact, the
Court noted what it considered to be the perverse effects of the
statute, that is favoring only the financially secure wife whose
husband is in need. In reversing the judgment and remanding
to the Alabama court, Justice Brennan opined that the statute
could be "validated by. . .amendments which either (1) per-
mit awards to husbands as well as wives, or (2) deny alimony
to both parties."' 8 Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment in Loyacano and remanded the
14. In his concurring opinion, Justice Dennis recognized the confusion which will
result from the court's decision:
It should be noted that our various opinions today leave the status of Civil Code
Article 160 in a state of considerable doubt. Three members of the Court are of
the opinion that the article is constitutional and does not deny equal protection
of the laws although it discriminates on the basis of sex in granting an important
statutory right. Three other members of the Court are of the opinion that if the
article were to be interpreted to deny alimony to one sex that it would be
unconstitutional, but that it does not contain such a prohibition; and that, since
there is other authority in the civil code for granting alimony rights to both
sexes, Article 160 does not deny equal protection of the laws. One member of
the court is of the view that Article 160 is unconstitutional.
358 So. 2d at 317.
15. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
16. Id. at 1111.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1108.
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case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for further consideration
in light of the Orr decision."
Not at Fault
Only "[wihen the wife has not been at fault" may
she seek alimony after divorce under the provisions of article
160 of the Civil Code. Consistently, the jurisprudence has de-
fined "fault" as a serious, "independent contributory or proxi-
mate cause of the separation rather than a justifiable or natural
response to initial fault on the part of the husband."" Although
seemingly a definition not difficult to apply, the courts have
encountered problems in its application when the divorce was
preceded by a judgment of separation from bed and board.
After inconsistent courts of appeal decisions, the supreme
court in Fulmer v. Fulmer2 resolved the dilemma of the effect
of a prior separation judgment on the issue of fault for alimony
purposes. Although not res judicata on the issue of fault,2 the
judgment of separation would be determinative of the fault
issue and preclude its relitigation. Justice Tate, by examining
the statutory history of article 160, concluded that it was the
intent of the legislature to prohibit relitigation of fault for ali-
mony purposes where there has been a prior judgment of sepa-
ration from bed and board, at least when the grounds for di-
vorce were non-reconciliation for the statutory period after sep-
aration.U The legislative choice, Tate assumed, is based upon
two policies-judicial economy and "consistency represented
by having the separation-causing fault determined once and in
the separation proceeding itself, rather than litigating (or re-
litigating) it in the much later divorce proceeding-where, with
different testimony or less recent recollection, the separation-
19. 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979).
20. Adler v. Adler, 239 So. 2d 494, 496 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 La.
168, 241 So. 2d 530 (1970), and cases cited therein.
21. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
22. Id. at 625. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2286, which reads:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was
the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the demand
must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be between the
same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same quality.
23. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 702, § 1.
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causing fault might even be determined contrary to that deter-
mined at an earlier well-tried and hotly-contested separation
adjudication."" Despite the articulated policy underlying arti-
cle 160, Tate stated: "[T]he judicial determination is conclu-
sive whether. . . determined after a contested hearing or...
upon confirmation of a judgment by default."2"
Carefully developing the rationale of Fulmer by statutory
interpretation of article 160, Justice Tate did not rely upon
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel (estoppel by
judgment)." The reason becomes obvious after Welch v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp.," in which the court held that collateral es-
toppel was "[n]ot susceptible of orderly application in a [civil
law] jurisdiction." 8 In Welch the court concluded that to rec-
ognize and apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel would ef-
fectuate a fundamental change in policy from that expressed
by the legislature in article 2286 of the Civil Code, 9 which
reflects the belief that "[tihe inconvenience caused by reliti-
gation is outweighed by the injustice of perpetuating erroneous
judicial decisions." 0
The effect, if any, of Welch upon Fulmer, is obviously not
direct because of Justice Tate's rationale in Fulmer. Yet, if
there is a factual situation involving a prior judgment of sepa-
ration which does not fall within the policy articulated in
Fulmer underlying article 160, it follows that the more general
policy of article 2286, as articulated in Welch, must govern. In
Fulmer the articulated policy underlying the legislative choice
made in article 160 referred to consistency in judgments where
24. 301 So. 2d at 625.
25. Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added).
26. Collateral estoppel was defined by the court in Welch v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978), as a doctrine of issue preclusion which prevents a
relitigation of issues actually decided in a prior suit between the parties on a different
cause of action. See Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287 (La. 1976), and cases cited
therein.
27. 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978), discussed in this Symposium at page 914.
28. Id. at 157. The reason expressed by the court for the inability to apply
collateral estoppel in Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, is "[b]ecause of a basic
difference between the meanings ascribed to the common law form 'cause of action'
and the civil law 'cause' in res judicata . . . ." Id.
29. See note 22, supra, for the text of article 2286.
30. 359 So. 2d 154, 157 (La. 1978).
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different testimony and less recent recollections result in differ-
ent judgments than that in a hotly contested separation judg-
ment. Although the court in Fulmer concluded in dicta that the
same result should obtain if the separation judgment was by
default, it is doubtful that such a conclusion can be maintained
after Welch. Unfortunately, the policy enunciated in Fulmer
did not incorporate a consideration of the defendant's
opportunity to litigate the issue of fault. For, in many cases,
the spouses are amenable to severing the marital relationship
by a default separation judgment, but unwilling to pay for it
in the form of alimony after divorce. Until the court has the
opportunity to clarify the policy of article 160 in light of Welch,
including some notion of "opportunity" to litigate the issue of
fault, it is arguable that Fulmer should not apply when the
separation judgment is obtained by default.
Preoccupation with fault originates with the French coun-
terpart to article 160.1' As explained by Planiol,32 fault as an
issue for the award of alimony finds its basis in the principle
that whatever act of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. 3 Properly
characterized, alimony historically was an indemnity. How-
ever, as Justice Dennis observed,4 article 160 does not neces-
sarily reflect such a view for the husband need not be proven
at fault. Elimination of the preoccupation with fault during the
separation proceedings could be accomplished simply by pro-
viding a ground for separation based on living separate and
apart for thirty days, as this author has previously urged.1 The
31. Code Napoleon art. 301 (1804).
32. 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE, pt. 1, no. 1259 at 696-97 1259 (La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959). Planiol states:
The community of life permitted the spouse without means to share the welfare
of the other. Suddenly through no fault of the spouse in question, he or she finds
himself or herself devoid of resources and plunged into poverty. It is manifestly
in such a case as this that the guilty party should be made to bear the conse-
quences of his wrong act.
Id.
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
34. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 308-09 n.12.
35. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Court for the 1973-1974
Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REv. 259, 265 (1975). Another expression in accord with this
view is Judge Lemmon's statement in Dixon v. Dixon, 357 So. 2d 856, 858 n.2 (La. App.
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legislature took the first step in this direction in 1977 by adding
a ground for separation based upon living separate and apart
for six months when affidavits are executed by both spouses
attesting that irreconcilable differences exist such as render the
common life together insupportable." Another alternative for
eliminating the preoccupation with fault is to remove fault
entirely from alimony considerations under article 160, as the
French have effectively done.37
To the extent that Fulmer remains unaffected by Welch,
its extensive dicta has been applied in numerous intermediate
court decisions. 8 One of the more difficult questions posed by
application of Fulmer is what effect, if any, does the husband's
post-separation fault have on the issue of the wife's right to
claim alimony. In Bruner v. Bruner" the husband had obtained
a judgment of separation from the wife on the ground of habit-
ual intemperance; subsequently, the wife sought a divorce on
the ground of adultery. When the wife claimed alimony, she
argued that Fulmer did not apply "where a divorce is sought
for post-separation fault such as adultery."40 The Second Cir-
4th Cir. 1978), where he stated:
It is indeed unfortunate that a spouse, who is separated because of incompatibil-
ity, must file a suit alleging fault in order to maintain an ancillary action for
support, since such a suit seriously impairs any chances for reconciliation. Fur-
thermore, present jurisprudence makes a default judgment of separation an
absolute bar to subsequent litigation of fault, if alimony is sought after divorce.
Thus, when one spouse is required to allege fault in order to obtain support and
the other is required to defend the allegations in order to avoid a conclusive
judgment on the issue of fault, the needless litigation at the separation level
probably eliminates any possibility of separation [sic] thereafter.
In fact, recent courts of appeal decisions indicate that it may be increasingly
difficult to obtain a separation under article 138 for fault, if there is a medical explana-
tion for the bizarre behavior, e.g., alcoholism or mental imbalance. See, e.g., Courville
v. Courville, 363 So. 2d 954 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Pearce v. Pearce, 344 So. 2d 75,
77 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). See also Justice Dennis' dissent in Bruner v. Bruner, 364
So. 2d 1015, 1020 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., dissenting).
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 138 (10).
37. C. civ. arts. 278, 280-1, described in Audit, Recent Revisions of the FRENCH
CMvL CODE, 38 LA. L. REv. 747, 776 (1978). See also Judge Beer's concurring opinion
in Rittiner v. Sinclair, No. 9421 (La. App. 4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1978).
38. See, e.g., cases reviewed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1976-1977 Term-Persons, 38 LA. L. REv. 322 (1978).
39. 356 So. 2d 1101 (La. App. 2d Cir.), aff'd, 364 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1978).
40. Id. at 1105.
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cuit Court of Appeal properly concluded that such a statement
was dictum and not binding. Relying upon a decision by the
First Circuit Court of Appeal in which the same issue was
presented," the court denied the wife alimony because of her
fault. The wife then argued such a conclusion was an unconsti-
tutional denial of equal protection, because the husband was
favored on the effect of post-separation fault. In rejecting the
wife's constitutional challenge, the court cited Loyacano v.
Loyacano,2 on original hearing, for the proposition that since
husbands may now seek alimony the same rules would apply
to them.
On appeal, 3 the decision of the Second Circuit was af-
firmed." Admitting that the argument of the wife was forceful,
based upon the language in Fulmer, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held "that for the wife to be entitled to post-divorce
alimony our law requires that she be free from fault both prior
to the separation judgment and prior to the divorce."' 5 In so
concluding, the court cited Bennett v. Bennett,"6 Smith v.
Smith 7 and Moon v. Moon."5 No reference was made to proba-
ble legislative intent as evidenced by the legislative history of
article 160 so carefully developed in Fulmer.
Initially, the court's decision in Bruner seems correct be-
cause, as Justice Calogero observed, the language of article 160
indicates that only the wife's fault is relevant. Yet, when reex-
amining the language of Fulmer, not only that quoted by the
41. Bennett v. Bennett, 349 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So.
2d 167 (La. 1977).
42. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
43. 364 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1978).
44. On appeal in Bruner, Justice Calogero stated:
The only disparate treatment of husbands and wives is in requiring husbands
and not wives to pay post-divorce alimony under article 160. Relator's argument
is based on a fallacious premise. She fails to realize that only husbands and not
wives are obligated to pay alimony under article 160. She erroneously assumes
that an injustice results from requiring the wife to be free from fault both before
the separation and before the divorce regardless of the husband's pre-separation
or post-separation fault.
Id. at 1019.
45. Id.
46. 349 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 167 (La. 1977).
47. 216 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
48. 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
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wife but also the legislative history of article 160 which Justice
Tate concluded entitles the wife to alimony whenever she ob-
tains the divorce on the grounds of the husband's fault,"9 the
decision in Bruner seems erroneous. In Moon v. Moon, 50 involv-
ing almost the opposite factual situation, the Third Circuit
concluded that post-separation fault of the wife could be intro-
duced to deny her alimony; to do otherwise would be contrary
to the policy of encouraging reconciliation which underlies Re-
vised Statutes 9:302.11 To allow the husband to indiscrimina-
tely commit adultery after the separation judgment would not
further the policy of section 302 any more than allowing the
wife to commit adultery.
Not unlike the issue in Bruner, application of Fulmer also
presents a problem where the separation judgment is based
upon the doctrine of comparative rectitude, which compares
the fault of the spouses. By its application a spouse, although
at fault, may be awarded the separation when he has been
guilty of lesser fault than the other. If the judgment of separa-
tion is obtained because of mutual fault, article 141 of the Civil
Code provides that "permanent alimony shall not be allowed
49. The legislative history of article 160 prior to the 1964 amendment shows the
following: "When Article 160 was originally enacted in 1870, only a plaintiff spouse who
could prove one of the statutory faults for judicial separation or divorce could obtain
a divorce. . . .Article 160 allowed alimony to 'the wife who has obtained the divorce,'
if she had not sufficient means." 301 So. 2d 622, 625-26 (La. 1974). The court implicitly
concluded that the purpose of the 1964 amendment was limited and did not affect
interpretation of article 160 when the wife obtains a divorce on grounds of the hus-
band's fault.
50. 345 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 250 (La. 1977).
51. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950 & Supp. 1977) states:
When there has been no reconciliation between the spouses for a period of
one year or more from the date the judgment of separation from bed and board
was signed, either spouse may obtain a judgment of divorce. If an appeal is
taken, a suit for divorce may not be commenced until the day after the date
upon which the judgment becomes definitive as provided by Article 1842 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure or until the expiration of the time stated in
the preceding paragraph, whichever is later. When a judgment of divorce is
obtained by the husband against whom the judgment of separation from bed
and board was rendered, the wife has the same right to recover alimony as if
she had obtained the divorce. The provisions of this Section do not affect in any
way the right of the spouse who had obtained the care and custody of the
children, as provided by law, to retain such care and custody.
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thereafter following divorce."52 Should Fulmer apply where the
successful spouse was at fault, yet awarded the separation
judgment? Justice Tate, when considering contrary arguments
raised in Fulmer, mentioned the inherent problems of its appli-
cation because of the doctrine of comparative rectitude.53 But
in spite of those concerns he concluded that the separation
judgment is determinative of the issue of fault for alimony
purposes. The implication was that even where the judgment
is obtained by applying the doctrine of comparative rectitude
the rules of Fulmer should apply. Furthermore, the legislative
history of article 160 suggests that whenever the wife obtains
the judgment of separation on the grounds of the husband's
fault, whatever the circumstances, it was the intention of the
legislature that she be entitled to alimony. 4 The sole effect of
52. The doctrine of recrimination was also abrogated in divorce suits by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Thomason v. Thomason, 355 So. 2d 908 (La. 1978). In
footnote eight of the opinion the statement is made that if a divorce is rendered after
both spouses are found at fault, no alimony will be awarded under article 160.
In Brannon v. Brannon, 362 So. 2d 1164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), the court cited
footnote eight in Thomason as authority for holding that a wife who obtains a divorce
on the ground of adultery is not entitled to alimony if she is guilty of fault. The court
in Brannon, citing Thomason, relied upon the similarities of the facts-in particular,
the trial court's adjudication of mutual fault. Mutual fault in Thomason consisted of
the husband's conviction of a felony and the wife's adultery, both of which are grounds
for divorce under Civil Code article 139. In Brannon, the husband accused the wife of'
cruel treatment which led to the initial separation, a ground for separation only under
Civil Code article 138. Based upon a comparison of the grounds in article 138 and
article 139, it can be argued that in Brannon the faults were not mutual or equal in
degree of seriousness. Arguably, the doctrine of comparative rectitude was applied by
the trial court in awarding the wife the divorce. See text at note 55, infra. In addition
to the Thomason case, the court cited Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968), a pre-Fulmer decision which must be re-evaluated in light of Justice Tate's
legislative history of article 160.
53. Fulmer v. Fulmer, 301 So. 2d 622, 625 (La. 1974). Justice Tate stated:
However, we must frankly admit the forcefulness of the contrary argu-
ments, so persuasively set forth in brief in this case and as adopted by the second
and third line of decisions.
Also, since under the doctrine of comparative rectitude a wife may be
awarded a judicial separation if her husband's fault is greater than her own, a
judgment in her favor does not really determine that she is free of fault contrib-
uting to the separation.
Id.
54. Id. at 628. The court stated:
We thus held [in August v. Blache, 200 La. 1029, 9 So. 2d 402 (1942)] that,
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the judgment of separation "is a conclusive adjudication as to
which spouse's pre-separation fault primarily caused the sepa-
ration.'' 5 The same result obtains in a somewhat analogous
situation-the application of comparative negligence statutes.
The most popular comparative negligence system permits re-
covery if the plaintiff's negligence was not equal to or greater
than that of the defendant.5 In light of Planiol's expression as
to the philosophical source of article 160's concern with fault,57
the analogy may be apt, and in accord with current notions of
comparative fault. Yet, the supreme court decision in Bruner
indicates that the legislative history of article 160 and the dicta
in Fulmer may be ignored. Furthermore, under the literal lan-
guage of article 160, applied in Bruner, if the wife is "at fault,"
most recently interpreted as grounds for separation from bed
and board,58 she will not be entitled to alimony after divorce.
Without Sufficient Means for Support
Another element of proof under article 160 is that the wife
is "without sufficient means for her support." Support as rede-
fined in Bernhardt v. Bernhardt" includes, in addition to food,
shelter and clothing, "reasonable and necessary transportation
or automobile expenses, medical and drug expenses, utilities,
where the husband held at fault in the separation suit obtains a divorce on the
ground of nonreconciliation following the separation judgment, he is precluded
from contesting his wife's right to post-divorce alimony, if in need, because of
the judgment of separation in her favor based upon her husband's fault. This
ruling, based upon the legislative intent of Article 160, is determinative of the
present issue, unless the 1964 amendment altered the original intent that the
separation decree based upon the husband's fault recognized that any fault of
the wife had not caused the separation.
Thus, the 1964 amendment was not designed to alter the prior interpreta-
tion of article 160 with regard to the wife's entitlement to post-divorce alimony
if she had been awarded a judicial separation on the ground of the husband's
fault, at least when the final divorce was sought on the statutory ground pro-
vided by La. R.S. 9:302.
Id.
55. Id. at 629.
56. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1966).
57. See note 32, supra.
58. Rittiner v. Sinclair, No. 9421 (La. App. 4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1978).
59. 283 So. 2d 226 (La. 1973).
[Vol. 39
1979] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978 671
household expenses and the income tax liability generated by
alimony payments made to the former wife.""0 All of the wife's
assets, her capital and income,6 but not her earning capacity,"2
are included in a consideration of the wife's "means." Once
terms are defined it would seem that practical application
would not be difficult. But such has not been the experience.
In Smith v. Smith3 a wife with assets worth $20,000 was
held to have sufficient means for her support. To what extent
the wife had to deplete those assets before she would be entitled
to claim alimony was purposely left unanswered."4 For twenty-
five years Smith and its monetary index of $20,000 was relied
upon almost exclusively by intermediate courts as the solution
to the problems presented by determining when the wife had
sufficient means. Then, in Frederic v. Frederic,5 the court in-
troduced a new element into the consideration of whether the
wife had sufficient means for her support-the liquidity of her
assets. 6
Utilizing the liquidity language in Frederic, the First Cir-
cuit attempted to answer in part the question posed by Smith.
In Webster v. Webster" and Bryant v. Bryant,"8 the court first
divided the wife's assets into two categories-liquid and non-
liquid. Then the court concluded that the wife must deplete her
60. Id. at 229.
61. Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950).
62. Favrot v. Barnes, 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976); Ward v. Ward, 339 So. 2d 839
(La. 1976). See also LaBeuve v. LaBeuve, 352 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977);
Villemarette v. Villemarette, 352 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Depner v. Barker,
351 So. 2d 1264 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
63. 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950).
64. The court stated:
How far she should go in depleting her capital presents another question. Whilst
we do not think that she should be made to use it all, on the other hand, we do
not believe that the law intends that she can maintain it intact. . . . To what
extent the wife should be made to use up her capital before applying for the
alimony is a matter with which we are not concerned at this moment.
Id. at 655, 47 So. 2d at 35.
65. 302 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974).
66. Id. at 906. "This amount [$20,700] was liquid and is available for her sup-
port." See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Persons, 36 LA. L. REV. 339 (1976).
67. 308 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
68. 310 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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liquid assets before she would be entitled to alimony after di-
vorce." The answer given by the First Circuit has proved un-
satisfactory, creating problems in determining first what assets
were liquid and second to what extent the wife must deplete
her non-liquid assets before seeking alimony.
Finally, the supreme court in Loyacano v. Loyacano ° for-
mulated a rule of "reasonableness" when determining when the
wife has sufficient means for her support. Rejecting an arbi-
trary monetary index adopted by courts after Smith, Justice
Dennis developed a flexible rule which considers all of the fac-
tors and other circumstances relevant to the litigation-i. e.,
"the mental and physical health of the parties, their age and
life expectancy, the parties' other financial responsibilities, the
relative ability, education and work experience of the parties,"
and the potential effect of any contemplated depletion of assets
upon the children of the marriage."" Unquestionably, the deci-
sion and formulation of a "rule of reasonableness" reflect a
thorough and careful consideration of the difficult questions of
when and under what circumstances the wife must deplete her
assets before she is entitled to alimony.
In Boisfontaine v. Boisfontainel3 and Meyer v. Meyer, 7 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal applied Loyacano's "rule of
reasonableness" in determining in both cases that the wife
was entitled to alimony after divorce. Factors enumerated in
Loyacano and considered by the court were the type of assets,
their liquidity, the consequences of liquidating them, and the
69. The court stated:
We see no reason why she should not be required to deplete the liquid assets
she received in the settlement to provide her own food and clothing. . . .The
house has provided for the wife's shelter; and the liquid assets until they are all
consumed, should be used to provide her food and clothing. This, of course, does
not prevent her from petitioning the court at a later date when her liquid assets
have been depleted or upon some other change of circumstances, but until such
occurs, she has sufficient means for her own support.
308 So. 2d at 308 (emphasis added).
70. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978).
71. See text at note 62, supra. This may be an attempt to reintroduce the notion
of some consideration of the wife's earning capacity.
72. 358 So. 2d at 311.
73. 357 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
74. 357 So. 2d 832 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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respective financial ability of the parties. The trial court in
Boisfontaine found that the wife did not have sufficient means
for her maintenance after considering the nature of her assets75
reasoning "(1) she should be allowed to use the cash balance
[equity from sale of old home] as a down payment on a new
house, which was essentially substituting her share of the eq-
uity in the family home for equity in a smaller home, and (2)
she did not have to sell the furniture, furs and silverware before
being entitled to alimony, because she would use the furniture,
and the furs and silverware were 'of no great value, perhaps a
few thousand dollars worth.' ,"76 Approving the rationale of the
trial court, the court of appeal added that permitting the wife
to use part of the cash to acquire equity in a new home was not
unreasonable "if the new home is purchased at a reasonable
cost.""
In Meyer the wife contended that she had insufficient
means for her maintenance because the community property
remained unpartitioned. The husband countered that the
wife's share of the unpartitioned community property was
worth at least $80,000, based upon his rejected offer to pay her
that sum in settlement. The inventory reflected that the princi-
pal community asset was one-half interest in a partnership
operating as a business enterprise. Considering the nature of
the property, "the fact that the property is unpartitioned com-
munity property, "78 and the consequence of its liquidation, the
court held the wife presently had no available means with
which to purchase the necessities of life. Thus, proceeding cau-
75. The supreme court said:
Her cash on hand was approximately $200.00. In addition she had $6,636.00
remaining in a homestead account, representing the balance of the proceeds of
the community property settlement (in which she received about $17,000.00 and
paid $10,000.00 in bills), and she was to receive that week the sum of $25,747.00
as her share of the net proceeds of the sale of the family home. Other assets were
corporate stock worth $138.75, an eight-year old automobile valued at $250.00,
a promissory note executed by her mother in the amount of $5,000.00, a five-
year old fur jacket, a 26-year old fur coat, and certain furniture received in the
community property settlement.
357 So. 2d at 91.
76. Id. at 91-92.
77. Id. at 92.
78. 357 So. 2d 832, 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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tiously as Justice Dennis had warned,7" the court required the
husband to pay alimony until the community is settled or until
some provision is made to provide support to her through a
partial distribution of the property or an advance on the settle-
ment. 0
79. Justice Dennis stated: "The problem is of such a nature as to be insusceptible
of solution by any exact formula or monetary index, and the court should proceed with
great caution and due regard for the probable long range effects of any depletion
contemplated." Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304, 311 (La. 1978).
80. 357 So. 2d 832, 834 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
